Singapore divides over elite rule

By MurdochUni

A close presidential election confirms the growing rift between the ruling party and the public, writes Asia Research Centre’s Garry Rodan

Singapore’s presidential election last Saturday selected a new occupant for a largely ceremonial position. Yet the election’s conduct and outcome have wider political implications. Both highlighted tensions within the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) over the dominance of an elitist structure and ideology which is increasingly seen by many party members as an electoral liability.

The winner, Tony Tan, secured only 32.72% of the vote, prevailing by a mere 0.34%, or 7,269 of the 2.1 million votes cast by Singaporean citizens. This was despite his being the “establishment” candidate endorsed by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and a host of PAP-affiliated organizations in a notionally non-party political contest.

Singapore's new President, Tony Tan. Pic: AP.

It’s a surprising result given how utterly unsurprising presidential elections in the city-state are supposed to be. Past polls have been determined with little or no controversy. Outgoing President S.R. Nathan went uncontested in 1999 and 2005 and his predecessor, former PAP minister Ong Teng Cheong, won with a decisive margin of 16 percentage points in 1993. Highly restrictive eligibility criteria favor establishment figures.

Indeed the office in its current form, created in 1991, was supposed to offer the PAP a bulwark against the possibility that a freak result in a general election would usher in a large number of opposition members of parliament. The presidency was vested with veto power over any spending of accumulated government reserves (currently estimated at $250 billion) and the ability to make key public service appointments.

Yet in this weekend’s vote, the prime minister’s endorsement and the nod from PAP-linked trade unions— not to mention favorable treatment from government-controlled media—may have cost Mr. Tan as many votes as it gained. Mr. Tan’s establishment credentials as a former deputy prime minister and executive director of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund, actually increased the challenges of persuading voters that he would be best placed to scrutinize the PAP executive through custodial powers.

The lackluster support he garnered was not so much a statement about his personal standing (he remains well-respected) as a reaction against the PAP’s perceived arrogance and political paternalism. The image of a monolithic party-state directed by political elites picking electoral winners alienates an increasing number of voters.

The other three candidates gained significant traction with voters by trumpeting their determination to make the presidency a watchdog of sorts on the government. This might not be surprising coming from Tan Jee Say, who had contested the previous parliamentary election as an opposition candidate, and ended up in a distant third place on Saturday. But the theme was picked up by Tan Cheng Bock, a former PAP backbencher who came in second, and Tan Kin Lian, former head of an insurance cooperative and a PAP member for 30 years, who placed fourth.Read more.

So! Who Says Only Malaysia Arrest Protesters!

Daryl Hannah arrested in White House oil protest

American actress Daryl Hannah has been arrested in front of the White House along with other environmental protesters who oppose a planned oil pipeline from Canada to the US Gulf Coast.

Hannah was released after paying a $100 fine, following her arrest for failure to obey a lawful order, said US Park Police spokesman Sergeant David Schlosser.

More than 70 people were arrested in the Tar Sands Action protest on Tuesday, which is named after efforts to block the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project to bring oil sands petroleum from Canada to Texas refineries.Read more.

SELAMAT HARI RAYA

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How to Catch Qaddafi

BY BENJAMIN RUNKLE

History has a strange way of repeating itself, often more quickly than anticipated. Within hours of invading Panama in 1989, U.S. forces had decimated the Panamanian Defense Forces and were greeted as liberators by the long-suffering Panamanian people. Yet the failure to immediately capture Gen. Manuel Noriega, the thuggish, pock-marked Panamanian strongman, dominated perceptions of Operation Just Cause. At the first post-invasion news conference in Washington, reporters asked: "Could we really consider Just Cause successful as long as we did not have Noriega in custody?"

More than a decade later, coalition forces overwhelmed the Iraqi Army and seized Baghdad after a lightning three-week campaign in spring 2003. But the ostensible target of the invasion, dictator Saddam Hussein, disappeared. Despite the initial euphoria of liberation, ordinary Iraqis were plagued by a sense of growing unease and disbelief as graffiti praising Saddam began to emerge in Iraq's so-called Sunni Triangle, bearing messages such as "Saddam is still our leader" and "Saddam the hero will be back." While Noriega was apprehended within two weeks and the feared guerrilla campaign never developed, Saddam evaded coalition forces for eight months, during which time the Sunni insurgency that killed tens of thousands of Iraqis and nearly devastated Iraq coalesced.

Today, Libya's fate may similarly hinge on the apprehension of a deposed dictator. For even as forces loyal to the Western-backed National Transitional Council (NTC) storm Tripoli and attempt to consolidate control, the shadow of missing strongman Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi looms large over the country's future. The head of the NTC's provisional government, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, said Wednesday, Aug. 24,"The matter won't come to an end except when he's captured dead or alive" and "we fear mayhem and destruction from him because these are his values, upbringing, and practices." Or as a homemaker in Tripoli told the Wall Street Journal, "A part of me will always fear that he might come back, and until I see him in jail or hanging, that fear will remain."

In other words, capturing Qaddafi is critical to avoiding prolonged civil strife and achieving a strategically acceptable outcome in Libya. Recognizing this fact, the NTC announced a bounty of 2 million Libyan dinars -- approximately $1.35 million -- to anyone who captures the ousted leader and offered amnesty for past crimes to any member of the strongman's inner circle who either captures or kills him.

Given that deploying SEAL Team 6 is not an option, as Barack Obama's administration and Congress are united in their commitment to avoid the deployment of U.S. forces to Libya, what is the most likely way to capture Qaddafi? In my book Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to bin Laden, I recount the history of 11 previous strategic manhunts, examining which factors lead to success or failure in apprehending the targeted individual. I focus on six variables: the level of technology employed (both relative and absolute), troop strength, terrain, human intelligence, indigenous forces, and bilateral assistance.

I found four surprising conclusions. First, although U.S. forces almost always enjoy an edge in technology over their quarry, this advantage is never decisive. Second, troop strength is less important than the presence of reliable indigenous forces. Third, although terrain can influence individual campaigns, there is no single terrain type that predicts success or failure. Finally, more important than physical terrain is human terrain, or the ability to obtain intelligence tips from local populations or support from neighboring states to assist in the strategic manhunt.

Applied to Libya, these lessons suggest several courses of action necessary to apprehending Qaddafi.Read more.