Well Done Rosmah !

Hantu Laut

At least there is something good coming out from this lady than those who bashed, ridiculed, admonished and rained every possible expletives on her.Rosmah launches humantarian mission to Somalia here.

She was right to ignore her detractors and carry on doing what she wants to do, for herself, for her husband and for her country...... it's her business.

I was expecting MERCY Malaysia to have launched the mission much earlier but it seems they have just sent a needs assessment team to Somalia last night, here.

The United Nations offically declared famine in the country in the middle of July.Most Western aids organisations immediately kicked start their aids mission but the problems are just too huge for individual organisation to handle.Big donations should come from rich countries and corporations.



The British government and individuals have collected more than £50m - 80 times more than Somalia's former colonial masters, the Italians, who officials believe are not pulling their weight.

Oxfam, one of the first few aids organisation in Somalia has brought clean water and sanitation to the famine struck nation in early August.

There is a Chinese proverb that says "If you want happiness for an hour – take a nap. If you want happiness for a day – go fishing. If you want happiness for a month – get married. If you want happiness for a year – inherit a fortune. If you want happiness for a lifetime – help others"

Rosmah's detractors will have a field day looking for the negatives to ridicule her.

Well done Rosmah!

5 Signs the United States Is Collapsing

Hantu Laut

Our leaders and bureaucrats may want to read the book by Jared Diamond as mentioned in this review by Steve Walt.

Obviously, no one is infallible but continual mistakes and denial by leaders that they are making mistakes in their policy decisions could destroy the well being of a nation.

The United States has not failed or collapsed as yet but there is no guarantee it would not in the future.

We have seen states that used to prosper, declined to abysmal level. Argentina, Philippines and Zimbabwe just to mentioned a few.We have seen states rising from the ashes to become great economic powers, Japan,Germany and now China are nations that have seen massive destruction through wars.

Almost, the whole of the African continent is on the decline.Somalia, is a failed state in absolute sense of the word, it has no effective central authority, a state in total chaos, lawlessness and banditry.Sudan is a state run on genocide and atrocities.

The worst to come.Pakistan, another failed state in the making, a conflagration that could pose the biggest security threat to the civilised world.

We have seen the rise and fall of empires.We have seen the total disappearance of ancient civilisations.

These processes of decline and collapse of nations would continue as long as we have leaders who put self interests above that of the nation.

The way our politics are going Malaysia will not be an exception.

STEVE WALT

Earlier this summer I mentioned that I was reading Jared Diamond's Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, and I promised to sum up the insights that I had gleaned from it. The book is well-worth reading -- if not quite on a par with his earlier Guns, Germs, and Steel -- and you'll learn an enormous amount about a diverse set of past societies and the range of scientific knowledge (geology, botany, forensic archaeology, etc.) that is enabling us to understand why they prospered and/or declined.

The core of the book is a series of detailed case studies of societies that collapsed and disappeared because they were unable to adapt to demanding and/or deteriorating environmental, economic, or political conditions. He examines the fate of the Easter Islanders, the Mayans, the Anasazi of the Pacific Southwest, the Norse colonies in Western Greenland (among others), and contrasts them with other societies (e.g., the New Guinea highlanders) who managed to develop enduring modes of life in demanding circumstances. He also considers modern phenomenon such as the Rwandan genocide and China and Australia's environmental problems in light of these earlier examples.

I read the book because I am working on a project exploring why states (and groups and individuals) often find it difficult to "cut their losses" and abandon policies that are clearly not working. This topic is a subset of the larger (and to me, endlessly fascinating) question of why smart and well-educated people can nonetheless make disastrous (and with hindsight, obviously boneheaded) decisions. Diamond's work is also potentially relevant to the perennial debate on American decline: Is it occurring, is it inevitable, and how should we respond?

So what lessons does Diamond draw from his case studies, and what insights might we glean for the conduct of foreign policy? Here are a few thoughts that occurred to me as I finished the book.

First, he argues that sometimes societies fail to anticipate an emerging problem because they lack adequate knowledge or prior experience with the phenomenon at hand. Primitive societies may not have recognized the danger of soil depletion, for example, because they lacked an adequate understanding of basic soil chemistry. A society may also fail to spot trouble if the main problem it is facing recurs only infrequently, because the knowledge of how to detect or deal with the problem may have been forgotten. As he emphasizes, this is especially problematic for primitive societies that lack written records, but historical amnesia can also occur even in highly literate societies like our own.

By analogy, one could argue that some recent failures in U.S. foreign policy were of this sort. Hardly anybody anticipated that U.S. support for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin in Afghanistan would eventually lead to the formation of virulent anti-American terrorist groups, in part because the U.S. leaders didn't know very much about that part of the world and because public discourse about U.S. policy in the Middle East is filled with gaping holes. Similarly, the people who led us into Iraq in 2003 were remarkably ignorant about the history and basic character of Iraqi society (as well as the actual nature of Saddam's regime). To make matters worse, the U.S. military had forgotten many of the lessons of Vietnam and had to try to relearn them all over again, with only partial success.

Second, societies may fail to detect a growing problem if their leaders are too far removed from the source of the trouble. Diamond refers to this as the problem of "distant managers," and it may explain why U.S. policymakers often make decisions that seem foolish in hindsight. As I've noted here before, one problem facing U.S. foreign policymakers is the sheer number and scope of the problems they are trying to address, which inevitably forces them to rely on reports from distant subordinates and to address issues that they cannot be expected to understand very well. Barack Obama doesn't get to spend the next few years learning Pashto and immersing himself in the details of Afghan history and culture; instead, he has to make decisions based on what he is being told by people on the ground (who may or may not know more than he does). Unfortunately, the latter have obvious reasons to tell an upbeat story, if only to make their own efforts look good. If things are going badly, therefore, the people at the top back in Washington may be the last to know.

Third, serious problems may go undetected when a long-term negative trend is masked by large short-term fluctuations. Climate change is the classic illustration here: there are lots of short-term fluctuations in atmospheric temperature (daily, seasonally, annually and over eons), which allows climate change skeptics to seize upon any unusual cold snap as "evidence" that greenhouse gases are of no concern.

Similarly, it's easy to find short-term signs of American primacy that may be masking adverse long-term trends. Optimists can point to U.S. military predominance and the fact that the American economy is still the world's largest, or to the number of patents and Nobel Prizes that U.S. scientists continue to win. But just as the British empire reached its greatest territorial expanse after World War I (when its actual power was decidedly on the wane) these positive features may be largely a product of past investments (and good fortune) and focusing on them could lead us to miss the eroding foundations of American power.

A fourth source of foolish decisions is the well-known tendency for individuals to act in ways that in their own selfish interest but not in the interest of the society as a whole. The "tragedy of the commons" is a classic illustration of this problem, but one sees the same basic dynamic whenever a narrow interest group's preferences are allowed to trump the broader national interest. Tariffs to protect particular industries, or foreign policies designed to appease a particular domestic constituency are obvious cases in point.

Ironically, these problems may be especially acute in today's market-oriented democracies. We like to think that open societies foster a well-functioning "marketplace of ideas," and that the clash of different views will weed out foolish notions and ensure that problems get identified and addressed in a timely fashion. Sometimes that's probably true, but when well-funded special interests can readily pollute the national mind, intellectual market failure is the more likely result. After all, it is often easier and cheaper to invent self-serving lies and distortions than it is to ferret out the truth, and there are plenty of people (and organizations) for whom truth-telling is anathema and self-serving political propaganda is the norm. When professional falsifiers are more numerous, better-funded, and louder than truth-tellers, society will get dumber over time and will end up repeating the same blunders.

Fifth, even when a state or society recognizes that it is in trouble, Diamond identifies a number of pathologies that make it harder for them to adapt and survive. Political divisions may make it impossible to take timely action even when everyone realizes that something ought to be done (think gridlock in Congress), and key leaders may be prone to either "groupthink" or various forms of psychological denial. And the bad news here is that no one has ever devised an effective and universally reliable antidote to these problems.

Moreover, if a group's identity is based on certain cherished values or beliefs, it may be hard to abandon them even when survival is at stake. Diamond suggests that the Norse colonies in Greenland may have disappeared because the Norse were unwilling abandon certain traditional practices and imitate the local Inuits (e.g., by adopting seal hunting via kayaks), and it is easy to think of contemporary analogues to this sort of cultural rigidity. Military organizations often find it hard to abandon familiar doctrines and procedures, and states that are strongly committed to particular territorial objectives often find it nearly impossible to rethink these commitments. Look how long it took the French to leave Algeria, or consider the attachment to Kosovo that is central to Serbian nationalist thinking, and how it led them into a costly (and probably unnecessary) war in 1999.

To sum up (in Diamond's words):

Human societies and smaller groups make disastrous decisions for a whole sequence of reasons: failure to anticipate a problem, failure to perceive it once it has arisen, failure to attempt to solve it after it has been perceived, and failure to succeed in attempts to solve it."

That last point is worth highlighting too. Even when states do figure out that they're in trouble and get serious about trying to address the problem, they may still fail because a ready and affordable fix is not available. Given their remarkably fortunate history, Americans tend to think that any problem can be fixed if we just try hard enough. That was never true in the past and it isn't true today, and the real challenge remains learning how to distinguish between those situations where extra effort is likely to pay off and those where cutting one's losses makes a lot more sense. Foreign Policy.

Grovelling To The West, Malaysia A Failed State?

Hantu Laut

The following is Anwar Ibrahim interview with the 'Diplomat'.The article was undated but I believe the interview must have been quite recent.

Before you go any further let us examine what construes a failed state.

From Wikipedia:

The term failed state is often used by political commentators and journalists to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. In order to make this definition more precise, the following attributes, proposed by the Fund for Peace, are often used to characterize a failed state:

• loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein,
• erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions,
• an inability to provide reasonable public services, and
• an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

Common characteristics of a failing state include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations; and sharp economic decline ^[1].

Afghanistan is half a failed state.

Pakistan almost a failed state.

Somalia is a failed state

Has Malaysia any semblance of the abovementioned attributes?

ANWAR IBRAHIM INTERVIEW

The Diplomat

Let’s start by talking about the current situation in Malaysia. In a recent interview you described it as being almost a failed state, particularly in the context of its neighbours. What makes you say that and what in your opinion has caused that situation?

The issue of governance and in terms of failing to deal with the issue of endemic corruption, the judiciary is still questionable, so their decisions and independence and the absence of control; the media is so pervasive. For example, in the latest campaign there is a resurgence of the communist party. These are signs, you know, that [Malaysia] is becoming so authoritarian and so repressive. Why is there a need now to have a massive campaign in the government-controlled media – which is entirely, fully controlled by them – to suggest that there is a resurgence of communism?

There has also been a great deal of talk in Australia in particular about this being the Asia-Pacific Century. Do you agree with that? How do you see Malaysia benefiting from any possible shift in global economic and political power?

Well, I don’t have an issue against that, in terms of there’s a need to fortify and even strengthen the economic cooperation within the region. I think we should be all-encompassing in the region. So I think that now there has been eagerness, particularly in the light of the latest financial and economic crisis. But we have to move on first by putting our own house in order. Yes the impact is felt by all countries and the countries have to take measures with these stimulus packages, but the way it is being done is questionable. It must be transparent. And [in Malaysia] we have to look at how it’s being done in Malaysia compared to China. China focussed 40 per cent [of its stimulus] on infrastructure in the earthquake-affected areas; another 30 per cent on rural infrastructure…

I am no great friend of China, but still there are issues that I think we have to look [at] and study. Now compare this to Malaysia. Out of the $70 billion so-called package, the funds allocated for infrastructure per-say is only $15bn. But I charge there are embellishments to push the figure upwards: $10bn for the stockmarket; another $15-20bn for bank guarantees in case there are problems. So you are not talking about a proper stimulus package; we do not know where it is spent or how it is going. Even at a time of crisis, I would use this creative destruction because you can use this to improve and build anew, not to fortify and strengthen the auxiliary and corrupt practices.

So is there a real danger in your eyes of Malaysia slipping behind its neighbours, particularly in light of the current global financial crisis?

In terms of the fundamentals, I must admit that Malaysia is on a much stronger footing, partly because of better infrastructure and the financial services. In light of the last crisis of 1997-98, I think some of the measures have been adopted to strengthen the position of the financial institutions, including the banking sector. That I concede, and I think is something positive that will help us. Similarly there are a lot of reserves, which are quite strong, although, I think, slipping really fast.

Our concern is more with the issue of governance. If you fail to improve the institution of governance, including the casting of an economic policy and preparedness to move so that Malaysia becomes more competitive, then we will certainly lose out. In some sectors we have lost out even to Indonesia and Thailand, to China, of course, and even Vietnam now. So I think that we have to depart from the obsolete economic policies. Now I think some positives measures have been implemented – in the services sector, for example. But liberalising and bringing in foreign investors [counts for nothing when you] fail to deal with the more substantive issues, like the need for affirmative action. Then these policies can never be fully endorsed by the general public.

I am for the market economy and for liberalisation, but we cannot ignore the grinding poverty and we cannot ignore the importance for affirmative action based on need, not on race. And more important still, the need to strengthen the system of government; the judiciary mustbe independent. The media must be free. How do you then evaluate and assess the success of policies if the statistics are all questionable. The government says ‘Our growth is two per cent, inflation is 2.5 per cent.’ [But those figures are] generally not well accepted. The people still have doubts and questions and are cynical, and this is dangerous in a modern government.Read more..

Is Malaysia A Failed State? Stupid!

Hantu Laut

To divert attention away from the internal problems of Pakatan, the leaders in Pakatan, whether it makes sense or not, must constantly and persistently attack Najib.Even if they sound stupid, it doesn't matter, because most of their supporters are easily misguided and would believe even if it is a load of crap.

Lim Kit Siang may be a veteran politician but either he is stupid, ignorant or think majority of Malaysians are stupid when he lambasted Najib and branded him as utter failure as PM and says the evidence of Malaysia becoming a failed state is everywhere.

This decrepit old bugger just simply shoot his mouth not knowing what construes a failed state or signs of a nation going that way.Malaysia is no where near to becoming a failed state, nor are there any signs that we are moving in that direction.Even some of Noam Chomsky's theory of failed states in his book 'Failed States' is not all acceptable definition of a failed state.It's merely his opinion.

What is a failed state?

A failed state is perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. To be more precise it must have the following attributes.

• loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders.
• erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions,
• an inability to provide reasonable public services,
  
• an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community, and
• weak central government, ineffective control over its territories, widespread corruption, widespread lawlessness and sharp economic decline.

It is not just one or two things, it's a series of malady, that makes the making of a failed state.

Top of the list of failed states are Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad and Iraq.Even Pakistan is not yet considered a failed state but is showing strong sign of becoming one if the central government continue to be weak and could not handle the Taliban offensive.

The strongest sign that Malaysia could possibly become a failed state is if the leaders in Pakatan continue with their disinformation, raising of racial and religious issues and spreading of incendiary lies making the general public restive and creating potential development for civil disorder and violence.

Najib has only been in office for less than 100 days, it sounds terribly stupid of Lim to expect a wonder cure in such a short span of time.

Throw Out A Good Man, Installed A Crook

Hantu Laut

This could, if it happens, be the most dangerous failed state ever.The clock is ticking waiting for the day the extremists and religious fanatics to take over the state and throw the world into utter chaos and possible nuclear holocaust.

Pakistan is now moving much faster than before into becoming a failed state and a nightmare for the rest of the world. The Talibans, the most extreme of all Islamists, had taken over the Swat valley in the north just 100 miles from the capital Islamabad.The government is powerless and have surrendered the territory to this hordes of mad men.

Throw out a good man and installed a known crook, this is what you get.

Can Pakistan Be Governed?

TO ENTER the office where Asif Ali Zardari, the president of Pakistan, conducts his business, you head down a long corridor toward two wax statues of exceptionally tall soldiers, each in a long, white tunic with a glittering column of buttons. On closer inspection, these turn out to be actual humans who have been trained in the arts of immobility. The office they guard, though large, is not especially opulent or stupefying by the standards of such places. President Zardari met me just inside the doorway, then seated himself facing a widescreen TV displaying an image of fish swimming in a deep blue sea. His party spokesman, Farhatullah Babar, and his presidential spokesman, Farahnaz Ispahani, sat facing him, almost as rigid as the soldiers. Zardari is famous for straying off message and saying odd things or jumbling facts and figures. He is also famous for blaming his aides when things go wrong — and things have been going wrong quite a lot lately. Zardari’s aides didn’t want him to talk to me. Now they were tensely waiting for a mishap.

The president himself, natty in a navy suit, his black hair brilliantined to a sheen, was the very picture of ease. Zardari beamed when we talked about New York, where he often lived between 2004, when he was released from prison after eight years, and late 2007, when he returned to Pakistan not long after his wife, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated by terrorists. For all that painful recent history, Zardari is a suave and charming man with a sly grin, and he gives the impression of thoroughly enjoying what must be among the world’s least desirable jobs. Zardari had just been through the most dangerous weeks of his six months in office. He dissolved the government in Punjab, Pakistan’s dominant state, and called out the police to stop the country’s lawyers and leading opposition party from holding a “long march” to demand the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who had been sacked, along with most of the high judiciary, by Zardari’s predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Zardari defused the situation only by allowing Chaudhry’s return to office and giving in to other demands that he had previously and repeatedly rejected.

Yet, despite this spectacular reversal, the president was not in a remotely penitent state of mind over his handling of the protests against him. “Whoever killed my wife was seeking the Balkanization of Pakistan,” he told me. “There is a view that I saved Pakistan then” — by calling for calm at a perilous moment — “and there is a view that by making this decision I saved Pakistan again.” There had been, he said, a very real threat of a terrorist attack on the marchers on their way to Islamabad. That is why his government invoked a statute dating back to the British raj in order to authorize the police to arrest protesters and prevent the march from forming. I pointed out that Benazir Bhutto faced a far more specific threat and was outraged when General Musharraf kept her from speaking on the pretext of protecting her. The president didn’t miss a beat. “And therefore,” he rejoined, “we moved to the other side”: that is, he reversed his order to the police, and permitted the protesters’ march, just before giving in to their demands altogether. Read more....